CIVIL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP:

NOTES ON THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LABOR MOVEMENTS

William E. Forbatht
Labor organizers often have historical insights that historians prize.
Jack Getman's article in this Symposium describes a veteran organizer who
summed up his work in this way: he was teaching the labor movement what
he had learned from the civil rights movement which it had learned from
the labor movement! 1 It is the last leg of this compressed history that
interests me here. We tend to think that the civil rights movement
originated in the 1950s, in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.2 But,
as the organizer's shrewd insight suggests, the civil rights movement of the
1950s and 1960s actually had many roots in the labor movement of the
1930s and 1940s. The industrial unions created during the New Deal era
and their federation, the Committee of Industrial Organizations ("CIO"),
housed and fostered a remarkable civil rights movement. Half a million
black workers joined CIO unions and thrust themselves into the vanguard
of civil rights struggles. Those struggles, in turn, provided the seedbed for
much of the leadership and many initiatives of the civil rights movement of
the 1960s. These early struggles were not merely a dress rehearsal,
however; the union-based civil rights movement of New Deal America was
importantly different from the church-based movement of the sixties, not
only in its institutional base, but also in its vision of equal citizenship. This
largely forgotten era of civil rights history sheds light on key questions
about the present and future of the civil rights and labor movements.
This Article will draw a brief historical sketch of the New Deal civil
rights movement and its imprints on the 1960s. Using my own research
and that of other historians of twentieth-century law, politics, and social
movements, the Article will explore what Elizabeth Iglesias describes as
the shadowy status of social and economic rights in contemporary political
t Angus Wynne, Senior Professor of Civil Jurisprudence, Professor of History,
University of Texas at Austin.
1. See Jack Getman, The Fine Line Between Success and Failure in Strikes and
Organizing,2 U. PA. J. LAB. &EMP. L. 719, 727 (2000).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and legal discourse, and the need for activists and scholars to imagine
alternative institutional forms and legal frameworks that might secure such
rights.3 Events, initiatives, visions, and even rights talk, from the past
cannot be transplanted into the present. Yet, the prescience of many 1960s
civil rights and labor advocates about the problems of the present, their
efforts to anticipate and avoid today's inter-racial rifts, and their
surprisingly bold institutional alternatives may embolden us. The historical
contingency of their successes and failures, and the counterfactual history
that contingency invites us to imagine, also may inform our efforts and our
analysis. Finally, I will suggest that some of the institutional obstacles that
have impeded broad, inclusive social and economic rights in the past no
longer obtain today. This is only partly a matter of moral progress; it is
equally one of erosion and regression. Regardless of whether they operate
to our detriment or our advantage the past's differences illuminate the
uniqueness of the present and its possibilities.
I.

THE RIGHTS RHETORIC OF NEW DEAL LIBERALISM

Demands for social and economic rights framed the language of New
Deal reform. Whether one listened to union stump speeches or the
president's radio addresses, read the bills before Congress and the debates
surrounding them, or even attended the sessions of the American Law
Institute, robust social and economic rights talk (and ideas for
institutionalizing such rights) were everywhere. 4 In the wake of mass
unemployment, the right to decent work and a decent livelihood lay at the
heart of this emerging conception of social and economic citizenship. The
idea that government owes to every person a right to make a decent living
harked back to the Gilded Age,5 but only during the New Deal did this idea
and the more general conception of social citizenship that it anchored
become the outlook of a national administration and a party in power.
Along with the right to work and a right to livelihood went a right to social
insurance and a right to a measure of economic independence and
democracy. Always paramount was work, or what FDR's Committee on
Economic Security, which drafted the Social Security Act of 1935, called
employment assurance.6 Income security for those who could not work and
3. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Institutionalizing Economic Justice: A LatCrit
Perspective on the Imperatives of Linking the Reconstruction of "Community" to the
Transformation of Legal Structures That Institutionalize the Depoliticization and
Fragmentationof Labor/CommunitySolidarity,2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 773 (2000).
4. The following account draws on William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal
Citizenship,98 MICH. L. Rnv. 1 (1999).
5. See id. at 26-61 (tracing the principle and its changing meanings from
Reconstruction through the Progressive Era).
6. See H.R. Doc. No. 81, 79 CONG. REc. 1,546 (1935).
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public employment for those who could not find decent jobs in the private
economy had to become the "permanent policy of the government. 7 A
national guarantee assuring the "opportunity to make a living-a living
decent according to the standard of the time" was at the heart of the new
understanding of the word "liberty" that Roosevelt proclaimed during his
1936 reelection campaign.8
II.

THE DIXIECRATS' NEW DEAL
To say this was the outlook of the Democratic Party in Congress,

however, is to gloss over an important qualification.

Hailing from an

impoverished region with a populist tradition, most Southern Democrats were
staunch supporters of the New Deal until the late 1930s. In exchange for their
support, they insisted on decentralized administration, standardization of all
labor measures, and on key bills' exclusion of the main categories of Southern
Labor. Otherwise, how "were they going to get blacks to pick and chop
cotton, when Negroes [on federal work programs] were getting twice as much
as they had ever been paid" and when old-age insurance and social security
bills had provisions that "would demoralize our region," until the Southern
committee heads rewrote them.9
By allying with Northern Republicans, or by threatening to do so, they
stripped the main pieces of New Deal legislation of any design or provision
that threatened the separate Southern labor market and its distinctive melding
of class and caste relations, its racial segmentation, and its low wages.
Consider, for example, the Social Security Act. The Committee on Economic
Security had crafted the administration's proposals for social security
legislation to propitiate the Southerners. For that reason the proposals favored
state-level autonomy-albeit with national minimum standards-in the
unemployment insurance and assistance for the needy, aged, dependent
children, and blind programs. Only the old-age benefits program would be
purely federal.10 Yet, the Dixiecrats exacted more concessions from the
congressional sponsors of the administration bill. National standards for
7. 79 CONG. REc. 9283, 9284 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner).
8. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency (June
27, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 233
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS].
9. HARVARD SrrKoFF, A NEw DEAL FOR BLACKS (1978) (quoting Senator Carter Glass);
see also GAVIN WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH: REVOLUTIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY

SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 219 (1986). Congressman "Cotton Ed" Smith commented, "Any man
on this floor who has sense enough to read the English language knows that the main objective
of [the Fair Labor Standards bill] is, by human legislation, to overcome the splendid gifts of
God to the South." WRIGHT, supra.
10. See ARTHURJ. ALTrmYER, THEFORMATivEYEARS OF SOCIAL SECURrrY 14-15 (1968);
FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEvELT I KNEW 291 (1952).
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unemployment and old-age insurance were dropped and the administration's
commitment to include all employed persons in the unemployment and oldage insurance schemes was sacrificed. The price of Dixiecrat support
included drumming out of the insurance programs agricultural and domestic
workers-and thereby the majority of black Americans, who worked in these
two occupations.1
The AAA, the NRA, the National Labor Relations and Fair Labor
Standards Acts were all tailored in this fashion. More encompassing and
inclusive bills, such as those with national rather than local standards and
administration, enjoyed solid support from the Northern Democrats (and
broad but bootless support from disenfranchised southern blacks and poor
whites). However, the Southern Junkers and their "racial civilization" exacted
a price and FDR, willingly at first, paid up. 12 However, as the new industrial
unions of the CIO and the black voters of the North loomed large in FDR's
1936 reelection bid and his social and economic rights talk grew more and
more robust and universal, the southern attacks began. Governor Talmadge
of Georgia convened a "Grass Roots Convention " 13 to "Uphold the
Constitution" against "Negroes, the New Deal and Karl Marx," while Senator
Carter Glass of Virginia worried whether the white South "will have spirit and
era that Northern so-called
courage enough to face the new Reconstruction
4
Democrats are menacing us with."'
The next few years brought more "interference." Minimum wage
legislation, CIO organizing drives, rural poverty programs, and recurrent
political initiatives and mobilizations among the disenfranchised, both white
and black, began to undermine the political and economic sway of
industrialists and Black Belt landowners. Early New Deal programs like the
AAA had been tailored by local southern elites and their powerful
representatives in Congress to pour aid into southern agriculture without
upsetting the plantation system, but the inequities of these programs from
tenants' and sharecroppers' perspectives sparked protests and national debate.
CIO organizers, NAACP leaders, and progressive New Deal administrators
lent support to grassroots movements like the biracial Southern Tenant

11. See ALTMEYER, supra note 10, at 35; PERKINS, supra note 10, at 296-301; Kenneth
Finegold, Agriculture and the Politicsof U.S. Social Provision, in POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY
INTHEU.S. 199-234 (Weir et al. eds., 1998)
12. See generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW

DEAL: THE GROWTH OF THE CONSERVATIVE COALrTON IN CONGRESS 1933-1939 (1967)
(discussing the formation of a congressional conservative coalition representing diverse
constituencies all united against FDR's New Deal); SrrKOFF, supra note 9 (noting that
Southerner's saw the New Deal as threatening the notion of states regulating their own racial
affairs); Finegold, supranote 11; Ira Katznelson et al., Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto
in Congress, 1933-1950, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 283 (1993).
13. SrrKOFF, supra note 9, at 120.
14. l at 109.
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Farmers Union.1 5

By the late 1930s, then, roughly half of the Southerners in the Senate
voted consistently against FDR. Increasingly, roll call votes in both houses
revealed Southern Democrats joining with Republicans to oppose16
administration measures in the areas of labor reform and social inSurance.
With the coming of World War 1, FDR's gentleman's agreement with the
Dixiecrats collapsed. The solid South redrew its lines of toleration toward
New Deal reform, and southern Congressmen openly joined ranks with the
minority-party Republicans to defeat those 1940s legislative programs and
institutional reforms that looked toward completing the New Deal by enacting
and implementing FDR's "second Bill of Rights. 1 7 They gutted the
administration's 1945 Full Employment Act and took the lead in abolishing
the National Resources Planning Board.' These programs would have laid

an institutional foundation for active national labor market and full
employment policies. 9 The defeated and dismantled laws, agencies, and
innovations were ones that would have sustained the public rhetoric and
generated the new institutional capacities and commitments embodied in the
15. See SIDNEY BALDWIN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE FARM SECURnTY
ADMINISTRATION (1968); DAvID CONRAD, THE FORGOTEN FARMERS: THE STORY OF
SHARECROPPERS INTHE NEw DEAL (1968); DONALD H. GRUBBS, CRY FROM THE COTTON: THE
SOUTHERN TENANT FARMERS' UNION AND THE NEw DEAL (1971); EDWIN G. NOURSE ET AL.,
THREE YEARS OF THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMNISTRATION (1937); Lee J. Alston &
Joseph P. Ferrie, Resisting the Welfare State: Southern Opposition to the Farm Security
Administration, in THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN POLrrCAL ECONOMY (Robert Higgs ed.,
1985).
16. See SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 123-24; see also JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF
WELFARE 1-23 (1994); Katznelson et al., supra note 12 (analyzing Southern Democrats' voting
patterns in 89 Senate and 61 House roll call votes on critical New Deal bills and amendments).
17. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND AMERiCAN POLrnCAL
DEvELOPMENT: 1880-1980 152-68 (1984); MARION CLAWSON, NEW DEAL PLANNING: THE
NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD 283-332 (1981); BARRY DEAN KARL, EXECUTivE
REORGANIZATION AND REFORM INTHE NEw DEAL (1963); Katznelson et al., supra note 12.
18. For the most detailed legislative history of the administration's Full Employment Bill,
see STEPHEN KEMP BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW: THE STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT
AcT OF 1946 (1946). Bailey chronicles the efforts of Truman and his cabinet to pressure
Congress into passing the administration's 1945 bill. He makes clear that the key players in
gutting the bill were all Southern Democrats, in particular, Congressmen Carter Monasco of
Alabama and Will Whittington of Mississippi. Their key positions on the Expenditures
Committee, on the subcommittee that drafted the House substitute bill, as well as on the
Conference Committee, enabled them to engineer "excluding from the final legislation what
they considered to be dangerous federal commitments and assurances (including the wording
of the title)," as well as the original bill's provisions for new planning and budget offices and
capacities. Id.
at 165; see also CLAWSON, supra note 17 (analyzing the National Resources
Planning Board from its inception in 1933 through its dismantling in 1943).
19. See BAILEY, supra note 18; CLAWSON, supra note 17, at 283-332; KARL, supra note
17, at 145-78 (1963); MARGARET WEER, POLmCS AND JOBS 134-89 (1992); Ira Katznelson &
Bruce Pietrykowski, Rebuilding the American State: Evidencefrom the 1940s, 5 STUD. AM.
POL. DEv. 301 (1991); Katznelson et al., supranote 12.
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"all-important right to work," and the right "to train and retrain."
As a consequence, we have forgotten that New Dealers uniformly
insisted that the "right to a decent, remunerative job" was "the very hub of
social security"; that "employment assurance" was "paramount" over income
transfers in the original architecture of the New Deal welfare state and all the
major reports and proposals by New Deal cabinet commissions and
congressional policy-makers from 1934 onward through 1946.21

III. A LABOR-BASED CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Jim Crow stood between the popular support the New Deal vision of
social citizenship enjoyed and its enactment into law. The era saw a sustained
effort to oust him. Thus, Senator Glass of Virginia was not wrong. In the late
1930s and early 1940s a "new Reconstruction" did menace the South. The
great migration of African-Americans from the rural South to the industrial
cities of the North, which began during World War I, laid the foundation. By
the late thirties the black vote was "important and sometimes decisive" in
scores of Northern congressional districts,22 and black workers had become a
significant part of the nation's industrial work force23 With the birth of the
CIO, a new national labor organization welcomed black workers. During the
1930s blacks were central to union organizing throughout the nation-in
southern metal and coal mining, longshore, and tobacco manufacturing as
well as in northern auto, steel, and meatpacking. Equal rights for black
workers was a defining demand of the new CIO, and friend and foe alike
agreed that the new industrial unions would not have prevailed without the
militant support they won from blacks. 24
If interracial unionism seemed strategically necessary, it also forced the

20. Full Employment Bill: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Banking and Currencyon S.
380, 79th Cong. 2, 4, 10, 59 (1945); see also PHILIP HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO
EMPLOYMENT: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND THE UNEMPLOYED IN THE U.S. (1989).
21. See 79 CONG. REc. 9283 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner); PreliminaryReport of

the Staff of the Committee on Economic Security (Sept. 1934), in 12 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra
note 8, at 30; Final Report of the Committee on Economic Security (Jan. 15, 1935) in 12
PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 8, at 1; Address to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 7,
1943), in 12 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 8, at 21-34. See generallyHARVEY, supra note 20, at
1-23.
22. HENRY LEE MOON, BALANCE OF POWER: THE NEGRO VOTE 198 (1948); see also
SITKOFF, supranote 9.
23. See, e.g., IRA KATzNELSON, BLACK MEN, WHITE CITIES, RACE, POLITICS AND
MIGRATION (1976); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED

AMERICA (1991); SrTKOFF, supranote 9, at 89-92.
24. See generally HORACE CAYTON & GEORGE MIrcHELL, BLACK WORKERS AND THE
NEW UNIONS (1949); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT:
WALTER REUTHER AND THE FATE OF AMERICAN LABOR (1995); HERBERT NORTHRUP,
ORGANizED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (1944); ROBERT ZEIGER, THE CIO: A HISTORY (1995).
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CIO unions and their leaders to confront the question of what it means to be a
union. Was it a matter of wages and workplace governance, or was the future
of American apartheid also part of the union's agenda? One canny observer
of New Deal politics concluded that the CIO's battle for black rights became
"a vital symbol of the CIO's fight for equality for all Americans-especially
in the minds of [southern European] immigrant workers." 5 How far did this
symbolic identification with equal rights for black workers extend into
practice? At a time when blacks and whites lived thoroughly segregated lives
in both the North and South, the CIO unions provided virtually the only social
institutions where blacks and whites interacted on a serious, non-superficial
plane. CIO leaders and activists, black and white, led the era's battles not only
for workplace equality, but for civil and political rights. The CIO white rank
and file proved more ambivalent. Often ready to elect black shop stewards
and union officers, and to support the use of union resources on behalf of civil
rights organizing and legislation, white CIO workers in both regions waged
"hate strikes" to protest their own unions' efforts to integrate all-white job
categories. Yet, sometimes the same union local and plant saw impressive
instances
of white rank-and-file support for dismantling the color line at
26
work.

Meanwhile, the traditional leaders of the cause of racial equality found
the CIO an alarming upstart. From Detroit and Chicago to Winston-Salem
and Birmingham, NAACP newsletters and board meetings bristled with
misgivings about the "new crowd" of black union activists and their demands
for a more militant civil rights program.27 The NAACP, with its litigation and
social work orientation and its middle-class leadership, seemed ill-equipped to
act in the workplaces and working-class neighborhoods where black
Americans fought their most decisive battles. Instead, it was the 500,000
black workers in the CIO who became the vanguard of civil rights contests. A
study by one of the NAACP's chief foundation funders uneasily concluded,
"the characteristic movements among Negroes are now for the first time
SAMUELLUBELL, THE FUTREOFAMERICAN POLITICS 91-93 (1945).
THE NEGRO AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
56-63 (1968); AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTr RuDwicK, BLACK DETROIT AND THE RISE OF THE

25.

26. See generally JULIUS JACOBSON,

UAW (1979); Kevin Boyle, "There Are No Union Sorrows That the Union Can't Heal": The
Strugglefor RacialEquality in the UnitedAuto Workers, 1940-1960, 36 LAB. HIsT. 5 (1995);
Robert Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein, OpportunitiesFound and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and
the Early Civil Rights Movement, 75 J. AM. HIST. 786 (1988); Bruce Nelson, Class, Race and
Democracy in the CIO: The "New" LaborHistory Meets the "Wages of Whiteness", 41 INYL
REv. LAB. HIST. 351 (1996); Thomas Sugrue, Segmented Work, Race-Conscious Workers:
Structure,Agency, andDivision in the CIO Era, 41 INTL REV. LAB. HIST. 389 (1996).
27. See Beth Tompkins Bates, A New Crowd Challenges the Agenda of the Old Guard in
the NAACP, 1933-1941, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 340, 345 (1997); Korstad & Lichtenstein, supra
note 26, at 787-88. See generally ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIvIL
RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1915-1972 (1995); ROBIN D. G. KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE:
ALABAMA COMMUNISTs DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1990).
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becoming proletarian., 21 Similarly, a reporter for Crisis, the NAACP's
national journal, observed that the CIO had become a "lamp of democracy"
throughout the old Confederate states, stating, "The South has not known such
a force since the 2 9historic Union Leagues in the great days of the
Reconstruction era.

This movement gained much of its dynamism from the creative tension
that arose between unionized black workers and the federal government-a
relationship that Lichtenstein and Korstad compare to the one between the
church-based civil rights movement and the national government two decades
later.3 Brown v. Board legitimated the protest movement and sit-ins of the
early sixties, and the latter, in turn, lent political force and urgency to Brown's
unfulfilled promise of racial equality. Likewise, the rise of inclusive
industrial unions and the passage of New Deal labor legislation provided
working-class blacks with a new standard to legitimate grass roots civil rights
protests and demands for reform.
The "one man, one vote" policy implemented in thousands of National
Labor Relations Board elections enfranchised black industrial workers who
never before had voted or participated as rights-bearers in the public sphere.
The new unions, in turn, offered black workers industrial citizenship, which
involved participating in union governance and deliberating and deciding
upon workplace grievances and broader goals. These experiences then
combined with the patriotic egalitarianism of the New Dealers' war-time
propaganda to generate a militant, rights consciousness among black workers,
as powerful in many ways as that evoked by the Baptist spirituality of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., a generation later.
This consciousness was manifested in the labor-led voting rights
movement across the South and in the leading black trade unionist A. Philip
Randolph's "March on Washington for Jobs and Equal Participation in
National Defense. 3 1 In 1941 Randolph called on "Negro America" to march
on the Capital because "ifAmerican democracy will not give jobs to its toilers
because of race or color... it is a hollow mockery. 3 2 Roosevelt responded
28. Memorandum of Conferences of Alexander Johnson and Ebree on the Rosenwald
Fund's Programin Race Relations, in ROSENWALD FUND PAPERS, RACE RELATIONS FOLDER
(June 27, 1942) (on file at Fisk University), quoted in Richard M. Dalfiume, The "Forgotten
Years" of the Negro Revolution, 55 . AM. HIST. 90, 100, n.47 (1968).
29. Harold Preece, The South Stirs, 48 CRISIS 318 (1941), quoted in Korstad &
Lichtenstein, supra note 26, at 787.
30. See Korstad & Lichtenstein, supra note 26.
31. PAULA F. PFEFFER, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH, PIONEER OF THE CIVIL RGHTS MOVEMENT

45-118 (1990) (noting that Randolph organized the march in 1941 for the twin aims of
desegregation of the military and the opening of defense sector jobs to blacks. In exchange for
Roosevelt's creation of the FEPC, Randolph cancelled the march. The idea behind the marchrallying in large cities-continued under Randolph through the March on Washington
Movement).
32. A. Philip Randolph, Call to Negro America, n.d., in C. L. DELLUMS PAPERS, CARTON
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by creating the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), which
promised to end job discrimination in defense industries.3 1 The first civil
rights beachhead in the federal government since the Freedmen's Bureau, the
FEPC was a weak agency, but its interracial staff conducted well-publicized
hearings and investigations, exposing racist conditions and spurring on black
protest.34
Beginning in 1943, Randolph addressed rallies demanding a permanent
FEPC to be organized "roughly like the NLRB" with similar authority to
identify and adjudicate "violations of rights" and to "go to court if necessary."
Like the NLRA, this law would secure "the right to work without demeaning
discrimination."
While the NLRA protected the "dignity of union
membership and industrial 35
democracy," the new law would protect the
employment."
fair
of
"dignity
Bills to transform the war-time FEPC into a permanent federal agency
came before Congress in 1945, the same year that Congress took up the
administration's Full Employment Act.36 Both bills were cast as measures to
enact FDR's "second bill of rights." The social right to a 'job for all who can
work," and the civil "right to seek work without discrimination" 37 were two
sides of the same equation-both of them parts of the "economic rights of
American citizenship," which, beginning in the early 1940s, were consistently
declared by FDR as vested "regardless of race and color. 3 A year later, in
1946, the Dixiecrats defeated the civil right to work with filibusters and the
social right to work by gutting the administration's bill in committee.
The defeat of these two core rights was no surprise to sober New
Dealers. Eight years had passed since the solid South first stopped the New
Deal's legislative engine in its tracks. Important nationally-based institutions
23, FOLDER: MARCH ON WASHINGTON (on file in Bancroft Library, U.C. Berkeley), quoted in
Eileen Boris, "The Right to Work Is the Right to Live". FairEmployment and the Questfor
Social Citizenship (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
33. See MERL E. REED, SEEDTIME FOR THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: THE
PRESIDENTIS COMMMrME ON FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACnCE, 1941-1946 (1991).

34. See id.
35. Daniel Bell, A. Philip Randolph Leads Drive for Permanent FEPC, NEW LEADER,
Sept. 18, 1943, at 1.
36. See BAILEY, supra note 18.
37. 91 CONG. REC. A2882 (1945) (extension of remarks of Hon. Ellis E. Patterson of
California).
38. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address at Soldier's Field, Chicago, Illinois (Oct.
28, 1944), in 3 PUB. PAPERS, supra note 8, at 370; see also Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message
to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 PUB. PAPERS supra note 8, at
41 (hypothesizing "a second Bill of Rights... regardless of station, race or creed");
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 6,
1945), in 13 PUB. PAPERS, supra note 8, at 503 (reiterating "an American economic bill of
rights").
39. See CLAWSON, supranote 17; REED, supranote 33, at 321-44; see also BAILEY, supra
note 18 at 165-66.
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and reformers had begun to assail the Solid South, realizing that the future of
New Deal reform hinged on confronting Jim Crow.
In the summer of 1938, Roosevelt intervened in several primary
elections in the South, hoping to defeat some of the most prominent
reactionary Democrats. For the first time, he openly attacked the South's
Congressional leadership for thwarting legislation that would reform the
South's "low-wage economy" and its "feudal economic system."' 4 The
President met with success in "woo[ing] southern labor and tenant farmers
41
into the camp of his new liberalism," as his southern foes observed.
Nonetheless, the effort to unseat these foes was doomed by the fact that within
the white primary, the poll tax and other restrictions kept most blacks and a
majority
of low-income whites (the "new liberalism's" constituency), from
42
voting.

If it did not stop the conservative Democrats, FDR's campaign to elect
southern liberals did help to galvanize the labor-based civil rights movement.
The 1938 primaries led to the founding of the Southern Conference on
Human Welfare (SCHW), a biracial coalition organized by southern trade
unionists and civil rights activists and funded by the CIO to attack
disenfranchisement
and complete the liberal realignment of the Democratic
43
Party.
More and more New Dealers agreed that completing the New Deal
demanded overturning Jim Crow. 1944 brought the Supreme Court's decision
in Smith v. Allwright,4 declaring the all-white primary unconstitutional. This
combined with an outpouring of money and black and white organizers by the
CIO to produce an extraordinary voter registration drive in the South. In a
few southern states like Alabama and Georgia, the number of black and poor
white voters increased several fold. At a rally in Birmingham, Osceola
McKaine, a black leader, recalled "those first bright days of Reconstruction
40. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Fireside Chat on the Party Primaries (June 24, 1938), in 7
PUB. PAPERS, supra note 8, at 399.
41. PATRicIA SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEw DEAL ERA
66 (1996).
42. See 7 PUBLiC PAPERS, supra note 8, at 399; SULUVAN, supra note 41, at 66 (quoting
the complaints of conservative southern Democrats). See generally RALPH J. BUNcHE, THE
POLITICAL STATUs OF THE NEGRO IN THE AGE OF FDR 384-437 (Dewey W. Grantham ed.,
1973).
43. "There is another South," SCHW President Clark Foreman proclaimed, "composed of
the great mass of small farmers, the sharecroppers, the industrial workers white and colored,
for the most part disfranchised [sic] by the poll tax and without spokesmen either in Congress,
in their state legislatures or in the press." This latter South, he claimed, "was the great majority
of the region's population." Were this majority mobilized and enabled to vote, he sanguinely
prophesized, the South could become "the most liberal region in the Nation." Memorandum
by Clark H. Foreman & James Dombrowski for the CIO Executive Board (Nov. 13, 1944),
quoted in NuMAN V. BARTLEY, THE NEW SoUTH, 1945-1980 24 n.46 (1995).
44. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

2000]

CIVIL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP

[when] the legislatures controlled by the newly freed slaves and the
emancipated poor whites gave to our region its first democratic governments."
"It was time, he said, for 'history to repeat itself."' 45
McKaine's prophecy would not be realized. The fraud, intimidation, and
violence that greeted the SCHW and the southern movement to revive the
democratic promise of Reconstruction confirmed once more how dependent
such a regional movement ultimately was on a national commitment to
decisive action based on a broad interpretation of constitutionally protected
civil and political rights. Presented with such a federal commitment, in the
late 1930s or early 1940s, perhaps a majority of hard-hit white Southerners
would have proved willing to forsake old political identities rooted in states'
rights and white supremacy, and wager once more on the promised boon of
social citizenship wedded to racial justice. But states' rights and white
supremacy remained too deeply etched in the national government and party
system from which such a commitment would have had to emerge.
The constitutional bad faith that for half a century enabled both parties
and all three branches of the federal government to condone or support both
Jim Crow and disenfranchisement produced the anomaly that was the
reactionary core at the heart of FDR's New Deal liberal coalition. This
excluded most of black America from the benefits of the main New Deal
programs. 46 This same constitutional bad faith at black America's expense
also deprived all Americans of the institutional foundations and ideological
legacy of social citizenship.
Broad social and economics rights talk fell into disuse after the decisive
defeats the New Deal agenda suffered in the 1940s. Blocked at every
legislative crossroad, the CIO, social citizenship's only powerful, organized
constituency, gradually abandoned its efforts to "complete the New Deal." By
the mid 1950s the industrial unions had begun instead to fashion with

45. SULLrVAN, supranote 41, at 191 (quoting Osceola McKaine, the first black man to run
for statewide office in South Carolina since Reconstruction, as he compared the current
movement to democratize Southern politics to the Reconstruction era).
46. Moreover, it produced a system of social provision that would remain split along
racial and class lines. Social Security originally embraced all three programs that fell within
the scope of the 1935 Act. In other words, the aid program for dependent children (later
AFDC) which, until 1996, we knew as "welfare" was part of social security. By the same
token, FDR's "general welfare Constitution" and "general welfare state" embraced all of the
New Deal social insurance programs, including contributory old-age insurance. Today, no
politician would associate social security with the "welfare state."
Of course, FDR and the CES distinguished between social insurance and public
assistance, but they also believed that within a generation, contributory old-age insurance
and unemployment insurance combined with employment assurance would cover almost
everyone and leave only a handful of people dependent upon public assistance. This belief
was premised on the exclusion of most of black America from the nascent general welfare
state. The illusion crumbled as soon as blacks won political rights and black poverty and
unemployment gained urban visibility.
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employers a private system of social provision and job security through
collective bargaining in core sectors of the economy. During the same
moment, the rigid consensus politics of the Cold War eclipsed the confident
liberalism of New Deal America.
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE "NEGROES' NEW DEAL"
Beginning with the Montgomery bus boycott in 1956 and culminating in
the epic confrontation in Birmingham, the wave of sit-ins, demonstrations,
and near-riots that swept the South and the nation in spring and summer 1963,
the civil rights movement opened the door to reform for the first time since
the 1930s.
Bayard Rustin was a lieutenant of A. Phillip Randolph during
Randolph's 1941 March on Washington campaign and chief organizer of the
1963 March on Washington. In 1964 Rustin warned the Democratic National
Convention that the "solution to our full citizenship" demanded more than
"the Civil Rights Bill."47 "What will [the Negro] gain by being permitted to
move to an integrated neighborhood if he cannot afford to do so because he is
unemployed .... [W]hat advantage is it to the Negro to establish that he
can.., go into any establishment
open to the public, if he is bound to [an
48
servitude?
economic]
It was "essential" but insufficient "to outlaw discrimination in
employment when there are not enough [jobs] to go around." "Civil rights,"
he told Congress the year before, "are built on" "the right to a decent
livelihood" or they rest on sand. 49 Indeed, "it would be dangerous and
misleading to call for enforcement of anti-discrimination measures without at
the same time calling attention to the declining number of employment
opportunities in many fields." 50 Rustin detailed the "displacement of lesser
and unskilled workers" in the nation's "relatively high-wage heavy industries
into which Negroes have moved since World War I" and the vast numbers of
black workers cast aside each year by the "diminishing number of [decently
paid unskilled and semi-skilled] jobs."' Nor was displacement "confined to
the cities," he went on, noting that "[m]echanization of agriculture" in the past
decade meant that "as the great city minorities feel the pressures of increasing
unemployment and poverty themselves, their numbers may be swelled by

47. Bayard Rustin, Address to Democratic National Convention (Aug. 1964),
microformed on Bayard Rustin Papers, Reel 3, at 27 [hereinafter Rustin, Address to
DemocraticNationalConvention].
48. Id. at 21.
49. Bayard Rustin, Draft for Testimony on FEP, (Fall 1963), microformed on Bayard
Rustin Papers, Reel 4, at 6-7 [hereinafter Rustin, Draftfor Testimony].
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at4.
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other unskilled workers from the country. 5 2 Rustin warned that "[w]e cannot
have fair employment until we have full employment." 3
This insight also drove Martin Luther King to launch the Poor People's
Campaign. King repeatedly told rallies, demonstrations, legislative hearings,
and White House conferences that the full emancipation of blacks demanded
a "contemporary social and economic Bill of Rights."5 4 King's Bill, like
FDR's, emphasized decent incomes, education, housing, and full
employment.55 The initiative that fleshed out King's Bill was the Freedom
Budget for All Americans. Its prompting came from the November 1965
White House Civil Rights Conference, where King, Randolph and others
underscored the inadequacy of the administration's anti-poverty programs.
The programs provided job counseling but no jobs. They targeted black
ghettoes as a kind of "riot control" and fostered the "mischievous" notion that
"the War on Poverty is solely to aid the colored poor. 5 6 Instead, King and
Randolph proposed a Freedom Budget. The Freedom Budget was a "multibillion dollar social investment to destroy the racial ghettoes of America,
decently house both the black and white poor, and to create full and fair
employment in the process. 5 7 Randolph compared the idea to the "social
investments of the New Deal," noting that the New Deal's labor legislation
and public investments did more than provide jobs and foster collective
bargaining. The investments also "evoked a new psychology of citizenship, a
new militancy and sense of dignity" among white workers, as would the
Freedom Budget among "millions of Negroes." The Freedom Budget would
be "[their] New Deal thirty years late."5'

52. Id. at 5. Increasingly, then, where blacks found work at all, they found themselves "to
an unusually high degree concentrated in poverty jobs: domestics, the janitorial occupations in
the service trades, laundry workers, etc. These are people who often labor a full two thousand
hours a year and who are, nevertheless, bitterly poor." Bayard Rustin, Freedom Budget
Article, n.d., microformed on Bayard Rustin Papers, Reel 13 at 5 [hereinafter Rustin, Freedom
BudgetArticle].
53. Rustin, Draftfor Testimony, supranote 49, at 7.
54. MARTIN LnH ER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE Go FROM

HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNrrY

193 (1967).
55. See iL at 163. King underscored the class-based character of his bill. "Any 'Negro
Bill of Rights,"' he wrote, "based upon the concept of compensatory treatment as a result of the
years of cultural and economic deprivation resulting from racial discrimination must give
greater emphasis to the alleviation of economic and cultural backwardness on the part of the
so-called 'poor white.' It is my opinion that many white workers whose economic condition is
not too far removed from the economic condition of his black brother, will find it difficult to
accept a 'Negro Bill of Rights,' which seeks to give special consideration to the Negro in the
context of unemployment, joblessness, etc. and does not take into sufficient account their
plight (that of the white worker)." DAviD GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS 312 (1986).
56. Rustin, Address to DemocraticNationalConvention, supra note 47, at 27.
57. Rustin, FreedomBudget Article, supranote 52, at 1.

58. Id.
at 9.
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A DIFFERENT GREAT SOCIETY AGENDA ON EMPLOYMENT AND CIVIL
RIGHTS

The same genre of full employment policies was pressed on Congress
and the President by Walter Reuther and the industrial union wing of the
AFL-CIO. 59 More strikingly, these policies found bold champions among the
New Dealers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and above all in
Johnson's Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz. Wirtz and others waged a
sustained battle against the partial and piecemeal social services/work
counseling approach being adopted by the War on Poverty. Wirtz eloquently
documented the "human slag heap" emerging in the nation's industrial
regions, including its central cities where black unemployment already had
begun to "explode." He urged regional and sectoral public investment, other
incentives
for job creation, and coordinated employment services and
6
training. 0
When Randolph and King enlisted Leon Keyserling to lead a group of
AFL-CIO, Department of Labor and academic economists charged with
drafting a detailed program for the Freedom Budget, they assured the
project's continuities with the New Deal, for Keyserling had been a principal
architect of both the Wagner Act and the original 1945 Full Employment
Bill. 61 Keyserling minced no words about the War on Poverty's "purely
'casework' or 'welfare' approach." Keyserling wrote that the premise of that
approach was that poverty sprang from "the personal characteristics of the
poor. '62 "Citing these characteristics as the major cause of poverty tends to
'blame' individuals, rather than the malfunctioning of the economy., 61 The
latter, however, was the principal problem, and the solution lay in complex
measures designed to improve the nationwide distribution of goods and
services, and to attack the problems of technological unemployment and
uneven growth as "interwoven with the assault on poverty." 64 This
59. See Korstad & Lichtenstein, supra note 26. See generally KEVIN BOYLE, THE UAW
(1995) (exploring organized labor's place in the
postwar political order by analyzing the national political activism of one CIO union, the
United Automobile Workers (UAW)).
60. See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, What Is Structural Unemployment? (Nov. 20, 1963), in
Administrative History of the Department of Labor, Vol. II,Documentary Supp., Sec. Ill-B,
Box 12, LBJ Library, at 3. See generallyMARGARET WEIR, POLITICS AND JOBS (1992).
61. See Bayard Rustin, Memo to GerhartColnm et al., (12/9/65), microformed on Bayard
Rustin Papers, Reel 12; Profile of Leon Keyserling, Freedom Budget Press Release,
microformed on Bayard Rustin Papers, Reel 12. For a detailed account of Keyserling's New
Deal activities, see Kenneth Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling
on Drafting the WagnerAct, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385-63 (1987).
62. LEON KEYSERIING, PROGRESS OR POVERTY: THE U.S. AT THE CROSSROADS 37
(1964).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 89.
AND THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM
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demanded a "focus upon the structure of job opportunity" and the "rapid
disappearance of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs throughout" the industrial
economy. 65 At the same time, Keyserling warned, it would be "chasing a
futility to expect that the hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of
unemployed young people and Negroes can suddenly be brought up to such
high levels of skills that they could be fitted into highly skilled jobs; and
even if they were brought up to these levels, there would not be enough of
these types of jobs for them. '66 Therefore, in addition to education and
training, Keyserling championed "remolding the structure of job opportunity
[so] that they can enter relatively unskilled jobs, and gradually progress to
better jobs as they acquire more skills," and he outlined the kinds of public
and private undertakings that could provide such opportunities. 67
Keyserling and Wirtz's ideas found a ready audience among many
Democrats in Congress, who had been weaned on New Deal full employment
economic ideas and ideals. In 1963 Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania
presided over eight months of hearings on proposed new fair employment
practices legislation, aimed at re-enacting some version of the war-time
FEPC. Like Keyserling and Wirtz, Clark and other Senate Democrats,
including the powerful majority leader Hubert Humphrey, thought it plain that
the problem of race discrimination in the nation's industries and workplaces
could not be addressed independently from the factors Bayard Rustin had
emphasized: the rapid disappearance of decently paid unskilled and semiskilled industrial jobs combined with the exodus of rural blacks to the
industrial cities of the South and North. On one hand, blacks were excluded
by blunt race discrimination from many unskilled and semi-skilled industrial
jobs as well as from the unions that controlled training and access to many
skilled trades. On the other hand, eliminating every vestige of race
discrimination would not qualify ill-educated and untrained AfricanAmericans for skilled work in blue or white collar callings; nor would it
remedy the lack of enough decently paid unskilled work. Senator Clark
echoed the words of Rustin and Randolph: "[W]e will not have full
employment until we have fair employment ....Government must take the
leadership in manpower and employment problems."' 68 Every black leader
who appeared before Clark's committee concurred. Even the cautious
Whitney Young had "no illusions that a complete absence of employment
discrimination will.., solve the problem of employment for many Negro

65. Id. at 97.
66. Id. at 95.
67. Id.
68. U.S. Senate, Equal Employment Opportunity, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Employment and Manpowerof the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong. 175
(1963) (remarks of Sen. Clark) [hereinafter HearingBefore the Committee on Labor].
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citizens." 69 Black civil rights spokesmen differed on the degree to which they
defended racial preferences or advantages as necessary ingredients in the
remedial arsenal; but not on the need for an expanded government role in
ensuring adequate education, training, and employment opportunities.
Several equal employment opportunity bills were before the
committee.7 0 Not all of them addressed that need. Most were variations on
the FEPC model, drawing on the experience of state-level FEPCs as well as
on the federal government's war-time FEPC and the recently created
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO), which
monitored compliance with Kennedy's 1961 executive order barring
discrimination by government contractors. In broad strokes, all these bills
barred discrimination in hiring and other employment decisions, all relied on
private complaints, followed by efforts at conciliation on the part of the
commission. The bills differed in their enforcement provisions. While some
required complainants to initiate suit in federal district court, others equipped
the federal agency with enforcement authority, making their orders
reviewable by federal courts of appeal. One bill, Senate Bill 1937 ,
sponsored by Humphrey and committee chair Clark, also gave the agency
itself authority to initiate investigations and suits, independent of private
complainants.
The Humphrey-Clark bill departed from the FEPC model in other ways,
which linked it directly to the concerns of Rustin and Randolph, Wirtz and
Keyserling. The bill was "geared," Humphrey told the committee, "to an
economy vastly different from the one existing in the late 1940s when the
initial state FEP commissions were created. 7' 2 The combination of vast
technological changes in industry and agricuiture with rising unemployment
presented problems very different from those that existed when the first
FEPCs were fashioned. As long as the unskilled and semi-skilled industrial
workforce was expanding in the industries and regions where previous black
gains had occurred, perhaps the "traditional concept of enforcing
nondiscrimination in employment" was sufficient. But the decline of these
traditional black jobs in the cities meant that black workers would have to
broaden their horizons; and black social networks often did not reach growing
sectors. The record of state FEPCs as well as the recent experience of the
PCEEO revealed that the number and saliency of complaints did not reflect or
spotlight broad barriers in the employment market.
[M]any of the problems.., result from.., practices not directly
related to overt discrimination ....Where are recruiting systems
which never locate qualified Negro technicians [and] vocational
69. Id. at 177 (statement of Whitney M. Young, Jr.).
70. See id. at 2-92.
71. See S. 1937, 88th Cong. (1963).
72. Hearing Before the Committee on Labor,supra note 68, at 142.
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high schools where Negro students are concentrated [which do
not offer] salient courses .... T]rainees for new jobs are selected
only from departments where Negroes have never worked. ... In
short, willful discrimination is often commingled with many
impersonal institutional processes which nevertheless
determine
3
the availability of jobs for nonwhite workers?
Drafted by John Field, who had been director of the PCEEO in 1961
and 1962, Senate Bill 1937 aimed to "operate simultaneously on two
fronts": it would "fight all forms of job discriminations and restrictions
based on race"; at the same time, it would "insure equal employment
opportunity in an economic system where certain types of jobs are
suddenly disappearing and other totally new categories of jobs are being
created [by] viewing the employment process in its totality." 74 Senate Bill
1937 proposed to locate
an Equal Employment Opportunity Administration [EEOA]
within the Department of Labor... enabling federal EEO
officials to draw on the new manpower training programs, the
regional efforts designed to stimulate additional job
opportunities, the technical and analytical expertise of the Bureau
of Labor
Statistics and the inspection skills of the Wage and Hour
75
Staff.

"[D]iscrimination," Field explained, "both present and inherited from the
past can be dealt with only by coordinating anti-discrimination with the
employment, training, manpower, and apprentice programs in the
Department." 76 Under Senate Bill 1937, the Secretary and EEOA would
not only investigate complaints, but also root out patterns of discrimination
and exclusion. They would address both through a combination of
enforcing anti-discrimination norms and coordinating job training and other
programs.
The ambitious bill enjoyed not only Humphrey and Clark's backing, but
also the support of the civil rights organizations that addressed the committee.
No one expected any kind of FEPC legislation to be included in the omnibus
civil rights legislation that Congress and the administration aimed to pass in
1963-64. There seemed, therefore, to be plenty of time to build up support for
the new approach. The 1963 March on Washington kept the jobs question
alive, but employment discrimination legislation was not its principle goal.
The march, a project of Randolph's Negro American Labor Council, was
aimed at underscoring the economic dimensions of racial justice, but King

73. Id. at 144-45 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
74. Id. at 142.
75. Id. at 145.
76. JuDrH STEIN, RUNNING STEEL 77 (1998).
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77
and other civil rights leaders rechristened it a March for Jobs and Freedom.
Among the speakers, only Randolph and the CIO's Walter Reuther raised
employment issues, but many of the 200,000 marchers were from unions and
carried placards urging "Jobs For All Now," "An FEPC Now," "Civil Rights
78
Plus Full Employment Equals Freedom," and "Higher Minimum Wages."
It was the September 1963 bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist
Church in Birmingham, where four young girls were killed, that brought a
FEPC bill into the package.79 This time the FEPC idea, which shaped the
House bill, was the familiar one. Once the House bill was attached to the
omnibus legislation in the wake of the Birmingham violence, keeping that bill
on board became the key goal of civil rights advocates. Clark planned to
substitute Senate Bill 1937 for the House version, but maneuvering the House
package through the Senate took priority and required all the political capital
its proponents could muster.8 0 After Senator Everett Dirksen, a powerful
Republican leader from Illinois, finished watering down Title VII, civil rights
advocates concluded the weakened bill was disastrous, stripping the EEOC of
any power to litigate and leaving the task of enforcement solely to private
plaintiffs.
A year later, Humphrey tried to convince Johnson that Title VII required
thorough revision, insisting that "the problems require much more than simply
eliminating overt racial discrimination." l Johnson was uninterested. Like
Kennedy before him, Johnson preferred to listen to those economic advisors
who assured him that tax cuts would spur economic growth and cure
unemployment for both blacks and whites.
These business-oriented
Keynesians ignored labor economists like Keyserling and Wirtz with their
suppler analyses of the changing structure of labor markets. Meanwhile, the
civil rights community had come to see the EEOC as their beachhead and
preferred to strengthen its enforcement powers rather than revisit more basic
issues.
Thus, Title VII's anti-discrimination norm became enshrined as the civil
rights movement's weapon for economic justice. When growth slowed after
1969 and measures like the War on Poverty proved puny or disposable, antidiscrimination became the only legal basis for attempts to increase black
employment. NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers and liberal federal
judges expanded the reach of the anti-discrimination norm and crafted
ambitious remedial decrees during the seventies. Ironically, as Judith Stein
has emphasized, this litigation most often was aimed at industries and
plants unionized by the CIO. The unions had gained formal seniority

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id. at 80.
Id. at 80-81.
See id.
See id. at 77-82.
Id.
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systems and promotion rules, and plaintiffs could seek and courts could
build remedial schemes on the basis of these systems, merging segregated
job pools and specifying quotas for advancement into skilled positions
along promotion ladders that non-union firms lacked. 82
While sweeping on paper, the decrees did not halt the technological
changes that led the jobs in contention to dwindle. Often too, the unions'
efforts to find common ground and craft compromises between white and
black workers' interests were undercut by the adversarial culture and
industrial ignorance of plaintiffs' attorneys. Affirmative action, as it
emerged out of Title VII litigation and other EEO contests, opened doors
for many. However, affirmative action took training and employment
institutions as it found them, as employers and private administrators had
fashioned them. As Stein shows, this pitted black workers against white.3
The Humphrey-Clark bill proposed to reform these institutions to
expand training and employment opportunities for blacks and, at the same
time, to broaden the base of work for blacks and whites alike, since both
confronted a shrinking world of decent industrial jobs. By melding antidiscrimination enforcement with job training, apprenticeship, and public
investment resources, the bill might have fostered a different and broadergauged form of NAACP advocacy. The organization's attorneys would
have been constrained to collaborate with labor economists and industrial
policy-makers in ways that would have enlarged its reform horizons and
institutional imagination, thrusting the organization into the arena of
economic development and industrial policy, which it began seriously to
enter twenty years later, in the eighties. By then, the limitations of antidiscrimination litigation for addressing black employment issues had
become painfully apparent. However, by then, too, ambitious social reform
was far from the national agenda; and the moment had passed when the
civil rights movement enjoyed substantial moral and political leverage over
Congress and the corporate elite.
To be sure, had Senate Bill 1937 become law, employers and unions
confronted with Title VII suits demanding black access to scarce jobs could
have tried to fob off such demands, insisting that the solution to racial
exclusion lay in federal job training and job creation initiatives. Such
responses, though, would not have satisfied a federal agency keen to prove
its mettle as an engine of civil rights progress. More likely, the availability
of federal resources would have been conditioned on integration of black
workers into existing job and training opportunities. In that case, unions
and civil rights advocates could have found common ground in their shared
interest in maximizing the availability of new training and job

82. See STEIN, supra note 76, at 89-168.

83. See id.
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opportunities. Thus, many conflicts over the legacy of racial exclusion
would no longer have taken the form of zero-sum contests between black
and white workers.
Consider a further and bolder counter-factual possibility. Its setting is
the time from the late sixties through the mid-seventies when recession and
galloping unemployment rates combined with high inflation to rule out the
post-War period's standard, business-oriented Keynesian policy of tax cuts
as the remedy for recession. This opened the political space for public job
creation.' 4 "Stagflation" was the rubric for this combination of economic
ills; and while these ills lasted, public job creation and public service
employment initiatives enjoyed broad support in Congress. The programs,
however, were largely high-jacked by local governments, which often used
them to substitute for public jobs funded at the local level, rather than
enlarging the overall pool of decent work. Meanwhile, efforts, like the
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill, to embed federal job creation
in a more robust and sophisticated framework of employment policy
commitments foundered for lack of robust support from labor, which
remained the one organized constituency potentially powerful enough to
push such a measure through Congress. 86 It is conceivable that several
years of intense experience on labor's part contending and advocating with
civil rights organizations for job training and job creation programs in
dozens of communities and industries under Humphrey's version of Title
VII would have served as a kind of institutional learning and strategy-and
vision-shaping process. This process, in turn, could have engendered a
base of support and a leadership more attuned to organized labor's interest
in committing Congress to a more robust and concerted response to
deindustrialization and the dwindling of high-wage, semi-skilled industrial
jobs. Perhaps, then, a labor/civil rights alliance would have ushered in the
right to decent work that eluded New Dealers' grasp a generation earlier.
Probably not, though. Enacting the costly and bold Freedom
Budget/Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment policies would have
required national mobilization and coalition-building on a vast scale. It
probably would have demanded a palpable threat of mass protest on the
part of the poor and working class, black and white-a felt crisis of
governability-sufficient to compel Congress to act and to give reformers
in government something of the strategic mobility over against business
they enjoyed in the 1930s. Otherwise, these structural economic reforms
could not pass.
To be sure, Walter Reuther and other progressive labor leaders
84. See HARVEY, supra note 20, at 15; GARY MuccIARONI, THE POLITICAL FAILURE OF
EMPLOYMENTPOLICY, 1945-1982 77-78 (1990); WEIR, supra note 19, at 101.
85. See MucciARoNi, supra note 84, at 85-88; WEIR, supra note 19, at ch. 4.
86. See MucciARONI, supra note 84, at 93-104; WEIR, supranote 19, at 136-44.
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supported the Freedom Budget/"Negroes' New Deal" vision; but not the
AFL-CIO under George Meaney's wing, and not even Reuther's own
constituents. Most of the latter, as Meaney pointedly observed, cared about
the pensions, health plans, and job security measures in their union
contracts, not about raising hell until government provided these things for
everyone. Ironically, as Nelson Lichtenstein has shown, Reuther's own
accomplishments had helped ensure that organized labor's grievances now
came in more administrable packages.8 7
Deindustrialization and blue-collar job losses happened slowly and
unevenly, industry by industry and region by region. Even given the
groundwork that experience under Senate Bill 1937 might have provided,
the process was unlikely to bring on so dramatic a change in the political
direction of organized labor nation-wide. Instead, it was a quiet kind of
crisis, which intensified the resentments bred by affirmative action, without
fueling any constructive political action; here, Senate Bill 1937 could well
have made a modest, but still crucial difference. As we have already noted,
Senate Bill 1937 would have provided the institutional resources and
capacities to bring employers, unions, civil rights advocates, and federal
administrators together-cooperating and contending over how to remedy
racial exclusion from industrial jobs, in a fashion that elicited the most
federal resources for jobs and job training. As the late 1960s and early
1970s ushered in a brief season of fairly ambitious job creation initiatives,
the resources for such experiments would have grown. Thus, in particular
places and industries around the country, examples would have arisen of
racially integrated public/private experiments in what came to be called
"high-wage strategies" for workers and communities dispossessed by
economic "restructuring." The resources and support from government and
employers surely would have diminished as the political climate grew
colder. Even then, however, the experience would have bequeathed to
labor and civil rights advocates a language of rights and remedies linking
racial and economic justice in the fashion first forged by the New Deal
era's civil rights movement. It would have shown us more about the
capacities of government to encourage and coordinate such high-wage
strategies and to bring the dispossessed into the economic mainstream.
Today, we would possess some valuable counter-models to the prevailing
bitterness among white workers regarding affirmative action and the
prevailing fatalism about how industrial restructuring must proceed-with
87. See KEvIN BOYLE, THE UAW AND THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1945NELSON LICHTENSTEN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETRorr: A
BiOGRAPHY OF WALTER REumTm (1996). Nor was Reuther's racial egalitarianism well-

1968 (1995);

rooted in the white rank and file of CIO unions like the UAW. See Thomas Sugrue,
Crabgrass-RootsPolitics:Race, Rights, and the ReactionAgainst Liberalism in the Urban
North, 1940-1964, 82 J. AM. HST. 551 (1995).
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rising inequalities and dwindling decent jobs in the midst of great
affluence.
VI. CONCLUSION

In sum, then, this excursion into counterfactual history suggests that
the tools of today's civil rights movement for addressing and attacking
economic inequality are surprisingly contingent. At the same time, this
contingency is not boundless. The gains won by industrial unions in the
form of pensions, health plans, high wages and job security-a private
system of social and economic rights embodied in collective bargaining
agreements made under New Deal labor laws-meant that in the 1960s and
1970s organized labor was not prepared to do battle for such bold and
costly new public commitments as Hawkins' Full Employment Bill.
Today, three decades later, however, this New Deal collective
bargaining system has largely unraveled, and with it, the relatively
generous private welfare state it undergirded for millions of organized
Sons and daughters of the steel and
workers in core industries.
autoworkers of the 1960s and 1970s feel dispossessed of the social standing
and security their parents enjoyed. Organized labor is groping for ways to
retrieve those gains; it knows that doing so will require heavy lifting in the
form of mass mobilization and broad-based solidarities across racial and
ethnic lines. It has trained its sights on organizing the unorganized at the
bottom of the economic ladder. Racial justice is high on labor's agenda,
both for African-Americans and new immigrant workers. The particular
policies and reforms championed in the 1960s and 1970s to wed racial and
economic justice-or "fair" and "full" employment-may no longer obtain.
What this history shows, though, is that the possibilities for remolding
institutions and recasting rights talk are never predetermined and often
renewed.

